J.T., Jr., a minor v. MONSTER MOUNTAIN, LLC, d/b/a Monster Mountain MX Park

Actual case print is here

754 F.Supp.2d 1323

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

J.T., Jr., a minor who sues by and through Susan THODE, his mother and next of friend, Plaintiff,


MONSTER MOUNTAIN, LLC, d/b/a Monster Mountain MX Park; Double AA Enterprises, LLC; Precision Cycles, LLC, d/b/a Track Side Performance Pro Shop; William Anderson, III; and Milan Harris, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:09cv643–WHA–TFM. | Dec. 9, 2010.


Background: Minor brought personal injury action against motocross park operator. Park operator moved for summary judgment.

[Holding:] The United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division W. Harold Albritton, Senior District Judge. held, that as a matter of first impression, liability release signed by coach, on behalf of minor, with parent’s written authority, was not binding on minor.

Motion denied.

West Headnotes (4)

[1]  InfantsAvoidance and   disaffirmanceInfants



Alabama applies the longstanding common law rule that, except   for a contract for necessaries, a minor   is not liable on any contract he makes and that he may disaffirm the same.


[2]  InfantsAvoidance and   disaffirmance 
Under Alabama law, the default rule is that contracts with minors are voidable.


[3]  Parent and ChildPossession and   control of property of child 
Under Alabama law, as predicted by the district court, release signed by coach on behalf   of minor competitive   motocross rider was not binding on minor,   in personal injury action by minor   against motocross park operator; although minor’s   parents signed a notarized document authorizing coach to act as minor’s legal guardian for   purposes of signing releases from liability, court had not approved release, as required for a parent   to bind a child to a settlement releasing   the child’s post-injury claims.1 Cases that cite   this headnote


[4]  Parent and ChildPossession and   control of property of child 
Under Alabama law, as predicted by the district court, a parent   may not bind a child to a pre-injury liability   waiver in favor of a for-profit activity sponsor by signing the liability waiver on the child’s   behalf.1 Cases that cite   this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*1323 Michael J. Crow, Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Richard Brett Garrett, Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC, Joseph William Warren, Joseph W. Warren, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.



W. HAROLD ALBRITTON, Senior District Judge.


This cause is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Monster Mountain, LLC (“Monster Mountain”); Double AA Enterprises, LLC (“Double AA”); and William Anderson, III (“Anderson,” collectively, the “Monster Mountain Defendants”) (Doc. # 30). The Plaintiff, J.T., Jr. (“J.T.”) filed a Complaint in this case alleging that Monster Mountain, Double AA, Anderson, Precision Cycles, LLC, and Milan Harris (collectively, the “Defendants”) are liable to him on the basis of premises liability, negligence, and *1324 wantonness. The Monster Mountain Defendants moved for summary judgment on the negligence cause of action, asserting that a contractual exculpatory clause bars J.T.’s claim. For the reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED.


Summary judgment is proper “if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” relying on submissions “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Both the party “asserting that a fact cannot be,” and a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed, must support their assertions by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). Acceptable materials under Rule 56(c)(1)(A) include “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”

To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).



The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant:

J.T. is a minor from the state of Indiana and a competitive motocross rider. On January 29, 2009, J.T. traveled to Monster Mountain MX Park in Alabama, a motocross park owned by Double AA. He was accompanied by several friends and his coach, James Tyler Thompson (“Thompson”). Prior to departing, J.T.’s parents signed a notarized document authorizing Thompson to “act as our son’s legal guardian in our absence for the purpose of signing all release of liability and registration forms and to give consent for medical treatment.” (Doc. # 30–1.)

To ride at Monster Mountain, all riders must pay an entry fee and execute a Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnity Agreement (the “Release”). The Release reads in pertinent part:

IN CONSIDERATION of being permitted to enter … EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, for himself, his personal representatives, heirs, and next of kin, acknowledges, agrees and represents *1325 that he has, or will immediately upon entering … [inspect the premises] …

[and] HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES, AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE the … track operator [or] track owner … from all liability to the undersigned, his personal representatives, assigns, heirs, and next of kin for any and all loss or damage … whether caused by the negligence of the releasees or otherwise while the undersigned is in or upon the restricted area …

[and] HEREBY AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND SAVE AND HOLD HARMLESS the releasees and each of them from any loss, liability, damage, or cost they may incur due to the presence of the undersigned in or upon the restricted area …


THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ AND VOLUNTARILY SIGNS THE RELEASE AND WAIVER … and further agrees that no oral representations, statements or inducements apart from the foregoing written agreement have been made.

(Doc. # 30–2.)

During his first three days at Monster Mountain, J.T. rode without incident. On the morning of February 1, 2009, J.T., Thompson, and the other riders who traveled with them, arrived at Monster Mountain for another day of riding.

After J.T. and Thompson signed the Release, with Thompson signing on J.T.’s behalf, Thompson paid J.T.’s entry fee, and J.T. entered Monster Mountain and began riding around the track. Subsequently, J.T. rode over a blind jump, became airborne, and crashed into a tractor on the track that he did not see until he was airborne. J.T. alleges, among other causes of action, that Defendants’ failure to remove the tractor from the track constituted negligence.


The issue before the court is whether J.T.’s negligence claims against the Monster Mountain Defendants are barred by the Release. The Monster Mountain Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because J.T. signed the Release and Thompson “signed [the Release] on [J.T.’s] behalf,” thus binding J.T. to a contract that exculpates the Monster Mountain Defendants from liability for J.T.’s injuries. (Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.)

J.T. responds that, under Alabama law, a contract made with a minor is voidable. Young v. Weaver, 883 So.2d 234, 236–37 (Ala.Civ.App.2003).1 J.T. argues that because the Release is effectively a contract with a minor, whether signed on his behalf or not, the Release is not binding on him.

The Monster Mountain Defendants concede that J.T.’s signature on the contract cannot make it binding, due to the rule that a contract with a minor is voidable. However, they attempt to overcome J.T.’s argument by asserting that Thompson, an adult who was acting on behalf of J.T.’s parents, signed the Release on J.T.’s behalf. Thus, the Monster Mountain Defendants contend that if a child’s parents, acting through an agent, sign an exculpatory contract on their child’s behalf, the contract is binding on the child and not voidable.

*1326 As the following discussion indicates, the court agrees with J.T., and therefore, summary judgment is due to be denied.

A. Alabama Law

The parties agree that Alabama law applies in this case. They also agree that Alabama courts have not addressed the specific factual situation presented by this case. However, Alabama courts have dealt with three relevant legal principles.

[1] First, Alabama, like virtually all jurisdictions, applies the longstanding common law rule that, except for a contract for necessaries, “a minor is not liable on any contract he makes and that he may disaffirm the same.” See, e.g., Young, 883 So.2d at 236 (internal punctuation omitted). This rule exists to protect minors from being taken advantage of by others due to minors’ “improvidence and incapacity.” Bell v. Burkhalter, 176 Ala. 62, 57 So. 460 (1912) (citing Am. Freehold Land Mortg. Co. v. Dykes, 111 Ala. 178, 18 So. 292, 294 (1895)). This rule is firmly entrenched in the common law and has existed at least since the year 1292. 5 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 9:2 (4th ed. 1993).

Second, while Alabama courts have noted an exception to this rule, that exception is narrow. In Peck v. Dill, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a parent could sign a binding contract on behalf of a child, pursuant to a health care plan, that required the child to subrogate the health insurer for injuries caused by third parties. 581 So.2d 800, 802 (Ala.1991), overruled on other grounds by (Ex Parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So.2d 543, 544, 546 (Ala.2000)). The court noted that contracts involving minors are generally voidable, yet carved out an exception to this default rule due to the following policy considerations (1) “the availability of medical insurance to minors depends on whether parents” can bind their children to these subrogation clauses; (2) “a minor cannot take the benefits of a contract while disaffirming the burdens;” and (3) a minor not bound to this subrogation clause would receive a windfall by recovering from both an insurer and a tortfeasor for the same injury. Id. at 804 (quoting Hamrick v. Hosp. Serv. Corp., 110 R.I. 634, 296 A.2d 15, 17–18 (1972)).

Third, Alabama courts have restricted the right of a parent or guardian to release a minor’s post-injury claims. Abernathy v. Colbert Cnty. Hosp. Bd., 388 So.2d 1207, 1209 (Ala.1980). Specifically, a parent or guardian cannot bind a minor to a settlement that releases the minor’s post-injury claims without express court approval. Id. The rationale behind the need for express court approval, similar to the voidable contract rule for minors, is to protect the minor’s “best interest[s].” Id.

[2] The teaching of these cases is that, in Alabama, the default rule is that contracts with minors are voidable. While the Alabama Supreme Court has shown willingness to make a narrow exception to this rule in the unique factual scenario from Peck v. Dill, that case serves as an exception, not a change in, the default rule.

B. Law from Other Jurisdictions

Because no Alabama case or statute directly addresses the issue of the case at bar, the court turns to the law of other jurisdictions for persuasive guidance. There are three important conclusions to be drawn from the law of other jurisdictions.

First, the majority rule in the United States is that parents may not bind their children to pre-injury liability waivers by signing the waivers on their children’s behalf. See, e.g., Galloway v. Iowa, 790 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 2010) (listing cases and stating that “the majority of state courts who have examined the issue … *1327 have concluded public policy precludes enforcement of a parent’s pre-injury waiver of her child’s cause of action for injuries caused by negligence”); Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (listing cases, and stating that “[i]n holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the majority of other jurisdictions.”).

Second, many courts rejecting parents’ right to bind children to pre-injury releases have relied on legal principles recognized by Alabama, as discussed above. For example, courts have relied in part on the principle that parents may not bind a child to a settlement releasing post-injury claims without court approval. Galloway, 790 N.W.2d at 257 (“As the Washington Supreme Court has noted, if a parent lacks authority without court approval to compromise and settle her minor child’s personal injury claim after an injury has occurred, ‘it makes little, if any, sense to conclude a parent has the authority to release a child’s cause of action prior to an injury.’ ”) (quoting Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 119 Wash.2d 484, 834 P.2d 6, 11–12 (1992)); accord Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 901 A.2d 381, 386 (2006); Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 262 Ill.App.3d 141, 199 Ill.Dec. 572, 634 N.E.2d 411, 414–15 (1994). Courts have also relied on the policy, also recognized in Alabama, of the state’s role of protecting minors from harm. See, e.g., Kirton, 997 So.2d at 357–58; Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 386; Meyer, 199 Ill.Dec. 572, 634 N.E.2d at 414–15.

Third, the only published decisions from other jurisdictions that have bound children to pre-injury releases executed by a parent or guardian on the child’s behalf have done so in the context of a “minor’s participation in school-run or community-sponsored activities.” Kirton, 997 So.2d at 356 (citing Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 224 Cal.App.3d 1559, 274 Cal.Rptr. 647 (1990)); Sharon v. City of Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 769 N.E.2d 738 (2002); Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (1998). By contrast, this court is not aware of a single case, that has not been overturned, that has held these clauses to be binding in the context of a for-profit activity.2

C. Application to the Case at Bar

[3] The court concludes, based on the law of Alabama as well as persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, that the Release signed by Thompson on J.T.’s behalf is not binding on J.T.

First, J.T. is a minor, so the applicable default rule under Alabama law is that any contract made with J.T. is voidable.

Second, there is no exception under current Alabama law that requires that this court apply a different rule under the facts of this case. For example, the policy considerations that the Alabama Supreme Court discussed in Peck, of ensuring that minors receive medical care and do not receive windfalls, do not apply to the facts of this case. This is not a case about a child receiving medical care, rather, it is a case about a child participating in a recreational event.

*1328 Third, under Alabama law, a parent may not bind a child to a settlement releasing the child’s post-injury claims without express court approval. This court agrees with the rationale of other jurisdictions that it would be completely illogical if, despite this rule, a parent could bind a child, before any injury occurs, to an exculpatory clause releasing parties from any liability for injuries which might be caused in the future, simply by signing a contract on the child’s behalf.

Fourth, the weight of authority in other jurisdictions suggests that the release in this case is not binding. The majority rule in jurisdictions throughout the United States is that a parent may not bind a child to a liability waiver. Moreover, and more significantly, no published decision that has not been overturned holds that a parent may bind a child to a liability waiver in favor of a for-profit entity, such as the Monster Mountain Defendants in this case. The few cases that have upheld a pre-injury waiver have made a point of emphasizing that the policy reasons for doing so are based on the fact of the defendant being a non-profit sponsor of the activity involved, such as with school extra-curriculars.

[4] Based on all of the above considerations, the court concludes that, under Alabama law, a parent may not bind a child to a pre-injury liability waiver in favor of a for-profit activity sponsor by signing the liability waiver on the child’s behalf. Accordingly, the Release Thompson signed on J.T.’s behalf, based on authority given by J.T.’s parents, does not bar J.T. from asserting a negligence claim against the Monster Mountain Defendants. Summary judgment on this issue in favor of the Monster Mountain Defendants, therefore, is due to be DENIED.3



For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 30) is ORDERED DENIED.


Parallel Citations

78 Fed.R.Serv.3d 182



1 One exception to the rule   that a contract with an infant is voidable at the election of the infant is   that “when an infant executes a contract, the infant is liable only on his   implied promise to pay for necessaries.” Ex parte Odem, 537 So.2d 919,   920 (Ala.1988).
2 In Cooper v. Aspen   Skiing Co., the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a Colorado   appellate court’s holding that a parent’s waiver on behalf of a minor was binding in favor of a for-profit   ski company. 48 P.3d 1229,   1230–31 (Colo.2002). That case was subsequently superseded by a   statute that stated that “[a] parent of a child may, on behalf of the child, release or waive the child’s   prospective claim for negligence.” Colo.Rev.Stat. §   13–22–107(3). The fact that Colorado’s legislature, not courts,   modified the default rule that a contract with a minor is voidable suggests that changing   this default rule should be a legislative choice.
3 The court does not hold   that an indemnity agreement, such as that contained in another clause of the Release, signed by parents in   order for their child to be allowed to participate in a dangerous activity,   would not be enforceable against the parties. That issue is not presented.






 End of   Document 






Power Kites


Well bought a new kite.  This kite is the Toxic 8.0 by HQ.  It is an 8 meter kite and pulls like a truck.  On the first day out as I was learning to fly it down in Huntington Beach, it became readily apparent that this Kite had all the pull I would need for my next crazy adventure of trying Kite Buggying.  As the winds picked up during the day, in the wind window it would pull me around on the sand.  Looking forward to more experimenting with this Kite.


Rode the Radiator Springs Ride at California Adventure this weekend. This is a great ride and worth the wait in line.  Very entertaining for all ages.  The kids will really love it.  The only problem is the line.  We got to the park and the ride was experiencing a temporary closure.  It was Saturday evening.  So we stopped and ate dinner.  After eating, the ride had re-opened and we got in line, we were past the 70 minute wait marker, so thought we would get in pretty quickly.   Well, as luck would have it, Disney had given out a ton of those fast pass tickets, so, as we moved forward all the fast pass people started coming.  This made the wait much longer than the less than 70 minutes it should have been.  It was something more like about 1 hour and forty minutes to get to the ride.  But, I have to say, it was worth the wait.


Monster Energy Cup

Went to MEC this weekend. Great racing. I am a big fan of Ryan Dungey. He is a great rider and all around class act. Well, interesting thing happened to him in the first couple of races. He caught his shift lever on a tuff block bending the shift lever back to where he was unable to shift with his foot. Obviously this had an adverse affect on his lap times, but, he didn’t quit and just kept going ultimately taking second overall. Anyway here is an interesting picture of him shifting by hand in mid air.


[Read more...]


Monster Energy Cup 2012

Monster Energy Cup Live on SPEED from Las Vegas

AURORA, Ill. (September 25, 2012) – Feld Motor Sports® announced today that SPEED will broadcast the second annual Monster Energy Cup live from Las Vegas’ Sam Boyd Stadium on October 20 at 7:00 p.m. PST.  SPEED will deliver 3.5 hours of live television coverage to the fans at home. Host Ralph Sheheen, a 24-year veteran motorsports broadcaster, and color analyst Jeff Emig, a three-time AMA Champion, will man the booth along with special guest Ricky Carmichael, a 15-time AMA National Champion, and pit reporter Erin Bates will capture all of the behind-the-scenes action.

“Ryan Villopoto turned the Monster Energy Cup into an instant classic when he swept the Main Events to pocket $1 million in last year’s inaugural event on SPEED,” said network President Scott Ackerson. “Any time you’re talking about that kind of money, that kind of energy and that kind of action, it makes for a fantastic program for the SPEED audience.”

“With an expected packed house at Sam Boyd Stadium for the live event, fans from around the world will be able to watch this epic battle unfold live on SPEED,” said Ken Hudgens, COO, Feld Motor Sports. “This year’s starting gate will be stacked full of the top Supercross and Supercross Lites Class riders.”

[Read more...]


Lost my Buddy Hunter Today.

My Friend Hunter

Hunter was my good friend.  Every night, he would come up and seek his attention.  He was friendly and loveable animal.  He died today of what we thing was a massive heart attack.  He will be missed.


Green Mountain Grill-first trial.

I got the Green Mountain Grill set up. After burning it in, the cooked our first set of ribs. I learned a few things about the Green Mountain Grill. First off, it is important to have the cap on the exhaust raised as high as possible. When I ran it with the cap closed down, the grill had a difficult time lowering its temperature. Increasing the gap made it very easy for the grill to get to the lower temperatures. This is important because smoking takes running the grill at approximately 180° to generate smoke for the smoky flavor in the ribs.

During the ribs on the Green Mountain Grill is a real pleasure. Once the grill was stabilized the temperature gauge on the grill was within 1 to 2° of the actual temperature at the cooking surface. The grill generated just the right amount of smoke so that the smoke flavor was not overpowering in the ribs. I was very satisfied with the way things turned out.

Next effort is going to be at smoking salmon. If any of you have a good recipe for smoking salmon, please let me know.

I will keep you posted with my grilling efforts.


Just bought the Jim Bowie Model Green Mountain Grill

Well, Finally broke down and bought the Green Mountain Grill – Jim Bowie Model. Bought it from Simi Pellet Grills. I strongly recommend this company. The will get you set up with what you need and treat your fairly. Keep posted and we will see how things turn out.

Here is the Description:

The Jim Bowie model comes with a digital control, a meat probe, a peaked lid for stand-up chicken/ large fowl/ rib racks, a convenience tray with utensil hooks and hard rubber tires. Also included is Sense-Mate, a thermal sensor which constantly monitors the ambient temperature. When it gets cold outside, it kicks the grill into Turbo mode so you don’t have to wait long for the grill to heat up! You’ll also get a venturi-style firebox for cyclone combustion, front casters, a positive pressure hopper fan to prevent burn-back, a dome thermometer and “fan only” mode with automatic grill shut-off to blow ash out of the firebox after you finish grilling. The stainless steel grate measures 37.5” X 16” (600 sq. in.) and the inside clearance is 13.5”. It weighs 183 pounds.

Available options include a stainless steel no-warp lid, and a form-fitted grill cover.


Fishing on Lake Coeur d’Alene

Went Fishing on Lake Coeur d’Alene. Didn’t catch much, but saw some very interesting scenery. Kind of like this house that was built directly on a rock.We were fishing for salmon. Trying to catch the salmon is a very difficult proposition. Initially, are set up was not correct in that we did not have downrigger’s but were rather using a sinking word type device. While this device got the date down to the area we wanted, it seems to done little except scare the fish away. Going to keep working on this and sooner or later we will get it right.
We stopped for lunch at the Coeur d’Alene resort. This is a really nice place to eat and you can pull your boat up to the dock and walk up and eat.






Hangtown 2012

Attended Hangtown this weekend. Great opening round to the MX 2012 season. James Stewart with his new Suzuki Team took first place in both Motos. Ryan Dungey after a bad start in Moto 1 cam back to 3rd. In moto 2, Dungey took 3nd behind Stewart,

In the 250 class Blake Bagget won both Motos. Roczen and Barcia came in second in the other 2 motos. Great racing.

The track was an a very observer friendly track. The area is a little hot. Found a great Restaraunt called Cattlemen’s. Very good Steak House.